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In this article I will illustrate affordances of decentralised technologies in the context of 
commons governance. My aim is to summarise the conversation around the lecture “When 
Ostrom Meets Blockchain: Exploring the Potentials of Blockchain for Commons Governance”
I gave in the Mereologies Open Seminar organised by The Bartlett School of Architecture at 
University College London on 25th April 2019. I will also extend the conversation by providing
a concrete example of such affordances in the context of a community network.
What is Blockchain? Three Key Concepts around Decentralised Technologies
In 2008, an anonymous paper presented Bitcoin: the first cryptocurrency based purely on a 
peer-to-peer system.[1] For the first time, no third parties were necessary to solve problems 
such as double-spending, thanks to cryptography. The solution was achieved through the 
introduction of a data structure known as a blockchain. In simple terms, a blockchain can be 
understood as a distributed ledger. Distributed refers to a technical property of a system in 
which certain components are located on different computers connected through a network. 
The blockchain, in this sense, can be thought of as a “decentralised book” in which agreed 
transactions can be stored in a set of distributed computers. Data, such as the history of 
monetary exchanges generated by using cryptocurrencies, can be stored in a blockchain. 
The key aspect resides in the fact that there is no need to trust a third party, such as a bank 
server, to store that information.
Nakamoto’s article opened what is considered to be the first generation of blockchain 
technologies.[2] This generation, up to approximately 2013, includes Bitcoin and a number of
crypto-currencies that appeared after it. The second generation, approximately from 2014 
onwards, is the extension of these blockchains with capabilities beyond currencies in the 
form of automatic agreements or smart contracts.[3] Smart contracts can be understood as 
distributed applications which encode clauses that are automatically enforced and executed 
without the need for a central authority. They can be employed, for example, to enable the 
execution of code to provide certifications, such as obtaining a diploma or a registry of lands,
according to previously mutually agreed rules. Again, the novel aspect here is the fact that 
the execution of such rules, in the form of computer instructions, is distributed across a large
number of computers without the need of a central point of control.
Complex sets of smart contracts can be developed to make it possible for multiple parties to 
interact with each other. This fostered the emergence of the last of the concepts I will 
introduce around decentralised technologies: Decentralised Autonomous Organisations 
(DAO). A DAO is a self-governed organisation in which interactions between the members of
the organisation are mediated by the rules embedded in the DAO code. These rules are sets
of smart contracts that encode such interactions. The rules embedded in the code are 
automatically enforced by the underlying technology, the blockchain, in a decentralised 
manner. DAOs could, for example, hire people to carry out certain tasks or compensate 
them for undertaking certain action. Overall, this can be understood as analogous to a legal 
organisation, with legal documents – bylaws – which define the rules of interaction among 
members. The development of DAOs has been, unsurprisingly, significantly popular around 
financial services.[4] However, DAOs could be used to provide a wide variety of services or 
management of resources in a more diverse range of areas. A more artistic example of a 
DAO is the Plantoid project,[5] a sculpture of a plant, which can hire artists to physically 
modify the sculpture itself according to the rules collectively agreed in the smart contracts 
encoded in it.
All of these potentials of decentralised technologies represent an emerging research field. 
Together with other colleagues of the EU project P2PModels,[6] we are exploring some of 
these potentials and limitations in the context of the collaborative economy and, more 
precisely, on some of the models emerging around Commons-Based Peer Production.
Collaborative Economy and Commons-Based Peer Production
The collaborative economy is a growing socio-economic phenomenon in which individuals 
produce, exchange and consume services and goods, coordinating through online software 
platforms. It is an umbrella concept that encompasses different initiatives and significantly 
different forms are emerging; there are models where large corporations control the platform,
thus ensuring its technologies and the knowledge held therein are proprietary and closed. 
Uber, a riding service, and AirBnB, a short-term lettings service, are perhaps the most well-
known examples of such initiatives. They differ from models that revolve around Commons-
Based Peer Production (CBPP), where individuals produce public goods by dispensing with 
hierarchical corporate structures and cooperating with their peers.[7] In these models, 
participants of the community govern the assets, freely sharing and developing technologies.
[8] Some of the most well-known examples of the initiatives around such commons-based 
models are Wikipedia and GNU/Linux, a Free/Libre Open Source Software (FLOSS) 
operating system. Commons-based models of the collaborative economy are, however, 
extending to areas as broad as open science, urban commons, community networks, peer 
funding and open design.[9]
Three main characteristics are salient in the literature on CBPP.[10] Firstly, CBPP is marked 
by decentralisation, since authority resides in individual agents rather than a central 
organiser. Secondly, it is commons-based since CBPP communities make frequent use of 
common resources. These resources can be material, such as in the case of 3D printers 
shared in small-scale workshops known as Fab Labs; or immaterial, such as the wiki pages 
of Wikipedia or the source code in a FLOSS project. Thirdly, non-monetary motivations are 
prevalent in the community. These motivations are, however, commonly intertwined with 
extrinsic motivations resulting in a wide spectrum of forms of value operating in CBPP 
communities,[11] beyond monetary value.[12]
Guifi.net: An Example of a CBPP Community in Action
In order to extend the discussion of the affordances of decentralised technologies in CBPP, I
will employ Guifi.net as an illustrative example. Guifi.net[13] is a community network: a 
participatory project whose goal is to create a free, open and neutral telecommunications 
network to provide access to the Internet. If you are reading this article online, you might be 
accessing it through a commercial Internet Service Provider. These are the companies 
which control the technical infrastructure you are using to connect to the Internet. They 
manage this infrastructure as a private good. The Guifi.net project, instead, manages this 
infrastructure as a commons. In other words, Guifi.net is organised around a CBPP model,
[14] in which the network infrastructure is governed as a common good. Over the past 16 
years, participants of Guifi.net have developed communitarian rules, legal licenses, 
technological tools and protocols which are constantly negotiated and implemented by the 
participants.
I have chosen to discuss the potentialities of blockchain drawing on Guifi.net, a community 
network, for two main reasons. Firstly, the most relevant type of commons governed in this 
case is shared infrastructure, such as fibre optic and routers. The governance of rival 
material goods, in contrast to the commons governance of non-rival goods such as source 
code or wiki pages, better matches the scope of the conversations which emerged during 
the symposium around architecture of the commons and the role played by participatory 
platforms.[15] Secondly, Guifi.net provides a large and complex case of governance of 
shared infrastructure. The growth experienced by Guifi.net’s infrastructure and community 
since the first pair of nodes were connected in a rural region of Catalonia in 2004 is 
significant. In their study of the evolution of governance in Guifi.net, Baig et al. reported a 
network infrastructure consisting of more than 28,500 operational nodes which cover a total 
length of around 50,000 km of links that are connected to the global Internet. This study 
refers to the period 2005–2015.[16] The latest statistics reported by Guifi.net state that there 
are more than 35,000 operational nodes and 63,000 km of links.[17] Beyond the 
infrastructure, the degree of participation in the community is also significant: more than 
13,000 registered participants up to 2015, according to the aforementioned study, and more 
than 50,000 users of this community network connect on a day to day basis, as reported by 
the community at present.[18] Thus, Guifi.net provides a suitable scenario for the analysis of 
the affordances of decentralised technologies for commons governance.
Ostrom’s Principles and Affordances of Decentralised Technologies for Commons 
Governance
How do communities of peers manage to successfully govern common resources? The 
study of the organisational aspects of how common goods might be governed was 
traditionally focussed on the study of natural resources. This commons dilemma was 
explored by Hardin in his influential article “The Tragedy of the Commons”, whose ideas 
became the dominant view. In this article, Hardin states how resources shared by individuals
acting as homo economicus (out of self-interest in order to maximise their own benefit) 
results in the depletion of the commons. The individuals' interests enter into conflict with the 
group's, and because they act independently according to their short-term interests, the 
result of the collective action depletes the commons.[19] As a consequence, in order to 
avoid this logic – “If I do not use it, someone else will”, which is not sustainable – it was 
necessary to manage these commons through either private ownership or centralised public 
administration. 
Later on, Nobel laureate researcher Elinor Ostrom questioned and revisited “The Tragedy of 
the Commons”. In her work, she showed how under certain conditions commons can indeed 
be managed in a sustainable way by local communities of peers. Her approach took into 
account that individual agents do not operate in isolation, nor are they driven solely by self 
interest. Instead, she argued that communities communicate to build processes and rules, 
with different degrees of explicitation, that ensure their sustainability.[20] This hypothesis 
was supported by a meta-analysis of a wide range of case studies,[21] and has been 
confirmed in subsequent research.[22] As part of this work, she identified a set of principles 
for the successful management of these commons,[23] which has also been subsequently 
applied to the study of collaborative communities whose work is mediated by digital 
platforms, such as Wikipedia and FLOSS communities:[24]
1. Clearly defined community boundaries: in order to define who has rights and 
privileges within the community.
2. Congruence between rules and local conditions: the rules that govern behaviour or 
commons use in a community should be flexible and based on local conditions that 
may change over time. These rules should be intimately associated with the 
commons, rather than relying on a “one-size-fits-all” regulation.
3. Collective choice arrangements: in order to best accomplish congruence (with 
principle number 2), people who are affected by these rules should be able to 
participate in their modification, and the costs of alteration should be kept low.
4. Monitoring: some individuals within the community act as monitors of behaviour in 
accordance with the rules derived from collective choice arrangements, and they 
should be accountable to the rest of the community.
5. Graduated sanctions: community members actively monitor and sanction one 
another when behaviour is found to conflict with community rules. Sanctions against 
members who violate the rules are aligned with the perceived severity of the 
infraction.
6. Conflict resolution mechanisms: members of the community should have access to 
low-cost spaces to resolve conflicts.
7. Local enforcement of local rules: local jurisdiction to create and enforce rules should 
be recognised by higher authorities.
8. Multiple layers of nested enterprises: by forming multiple nested layers of 
organisation, communities can address issues that affect resource management 
differently at both broader and local levels.
What kind of affordances do decentralised technologies offer in the context of commons 
governance and, more concretely, with regards to Ostrom’s principles? Together with other 
colleagues,[25] we have identified six potential affordances to be further explored. 
Firstly, tokenisation. This refers to the process of transforming the rights to perform an action
on an asset into a transferable data element (named token) on the blockchain. For example, 
tokens can be employed to provide authorisation to access a certain shared resource. 
Tokens may also be used to represent equity, decision-making power, property ownership or
labour certificates.[26]
Secondly, self-enforcement and formalisation of rules. These affordances refer to the 
process of embedding organisational rules in the form of smart contracts. As a result, there 
is an affordance for the self-enforcement of communitarian rules, such as those which 
regulate monitoring and graduated sanctions, as reflected in Ostrom’s principles 4 and 5. 
This encoding of rules also implies a formalisation, since blockchain technologies require 
these rules to be defined in ways that are unambiguously understood by machines. In other 
words, the inherent process of explicitation of rules related to the use of distributed 
technologies also provides opportunities to make these rules more available and visible for 
discussion, as noted in Ostrom’s principle 2.
Thirdly, autonomous automatisation: the process of defining complex sets of smart contracts
which may be set up in such a way as to make it possible for multiple parties to interact with 
each other without human interaction. This is analogous to software communicating with 
other software today, but in a decentralised manner. DAOs are an example of autonomous 
automatisation as they could be self-sufficient to a certain extent. For instance, they could 
charge users for their services.[27]
Fourthly, decentralised technologies offer an affordance for the decentralisation of power 
over the infrastructure. In other words, they can facilitate processes of communalising the 
ownership and control of the technological artefacts employed by the community. They do 
this through the decentralisation of the infrastructure they rely on, such as collaboration 
platforms employed for coordination.
Fifthly, transparency: for the opening of organisational processes and the associated data, 
by relying on the persistency and immutability properties of blockchain technologies.
Finally, decentralised technologies can facilitate processes of codification of a certain degree
of trust into systems which facilitate agreements between agents without requiring a third 
party. Figure 1 below provides a summary of the relationships between Elinor Ostrom’s 
principles and the aforementioned affordances.[28]
[Figure 1]
Figure 1 - Summary of the relationships between the identified affordances of blockchain 
technologies for governance and Ostrom’s principles (Ostrom 1990). Image credit:, identified
by Rozas et al., 2018.
These congruences allow us to describe the impact that blockchain technologies could have 
on governance processes in these communities. These decentralised technologies could 
facilitate coordination, help to scale up commons governance or even be useful to share 
agreements and different forms of value amongst various communities in interoperable 
ways, as shown by Pazaitis et al..[29] An example of how such affordances might be 
explored in the context of CBPP can be found in community networks such as Guifi.net.
A DAO for Commons Governance of Shared Technical Infrastructure
Would it be possible to build a DAO that might help to coordinate collaboration and scale up 
cooperative practices, in line with Ostrom’s principles, in a community network such as 
Guifi.net? First of all, we need to identify the relationship between Ostrom’s principles and 
Guifi.net. We can find, indeed, a wide exploration of the relationship between Ostrom’s 
principles and the evolution in the self-organisational processes of Guifi.net in the work of 
Baig et al..[30] They document in detail how Guifi.net governs the infrastructure as a 
commons drawing on these principles, and provide a detailed analysis of the different 
components of the commons governance of the shared infrastructure in Guifi.net. Secondly, 
we need to define an initial point of analysis, and tentative interventions, in the form of one of
the components of this form of commons governance. From all of these components, I will 
place the focus of analysis on the economic compensation system. The reason for selecting 
this system is twofold. On the one hand, it reflects the complexity behind commons 
governance and, thus, allows us to illustrate the aforementioned principles in greater depth. 
Secondly, it is an illustrative example of the potential of blockchain, as we shall see, to 
automatise and scale up various cooperative processes.
The economic compensation system of Guifi.net was designed as a mechanism to 
compensate imbalances in the uses of the shared infrastructure. Professional operators, for 
example, are requested to declare the expenditures and investments in the network. In 
alignment with Ostrom’s principle number 4, the use, expenditure and investments of 
operators are monitored, in this case by the most formal institution which has emerged in 
Guifi.net: the Guifi.net Foundation. The Foundation is a legal organisation with the goal to 
protect the shared infrastructure and monitor compliance with the rules agreed by the 
members of the community. The community boundaries, as in Ostrom’s principle number 1, 
are clearly defined and include several stakeholders.[31] Different degrees of commitment 
with the commons were defined as collective choice arrangements (principle number 3). 
These rules are, however, open to discussion through periodic meetings organised 
regionally, and adapted to the local conditions, in congruence with principle number 2. If any 
participant, such as an operator, misuses the resources or does not fulfill the principles, the 
individual is subject to graduated sanctions,[32] in alignment with principle number 5. As part
of the compensation system, compensation meetups are organised locally to cope with 
conflict resolution, in congruence with principle 6. Principles 6 and 7 are also clearly 
reflected in the evolution of the governance of Guifi.net, although they are more closely 
associated with scalability.[33] 
The compensation DAO could be formed by a set of local DAOs, whose rules are defined 
and modifiable exclusively by participants holding a token which demonstrates they belong 
to this node. These local DAOs could be deployed from templates, and could be modified at 
any point as a result of a discussion at the aforementioned periodic meetings held by local 
nodes and in congruence with the local conditions. Among the rules of the smart contracts 
composing these DAOs, participants may decide to define the different factors that are 
considered when discussing the local compensation system arrangements, as well as 
graduated sanctions in case of misuse of the common goods. These rules might be copied 
and adapted by some of the nodes facilitating the extension of the collaborative practices.
Some of the settings of these local DAOs could be dependent on a federal compensation 
DAO that defines general aspects. A mapping of the current logic could consist of reaching a
certain degree of consensus between the participants in all of the nodes, but having this 
process approved by the members of the Foundation, who would hold a specific token.  
Examples of general aspects regulated by the federal DAO are the levels of commitment 
towards the commons of each operator, which is currently evaluated and monitored 
manually by the Foundation. General aspects such as this could be automatised in several 
ways therefore moving from manual assignations by the Foundation, as is currently the 
case, to automatically assigned tokens depending on the communitarian activities tracked in 
the platform. This is an example of a possible intervention to automatise certain collaborative
practices assuming the current structure. Figure 1 below provides an overview of a 
preliminary design of a DAO for a compensation system mapping the current logics. 
[FIGURE 2]
Figure 2 - A proposal of a simple compensation DAO. The green arrows represent the 
extension of practices between local DAOs, including new nodes such as number 5. Black 
arrows represent the interactions between the local DAOs and the federal DAO, in 
congruence with Ostrom’s principle 8. Image credit: Rozas, et al, 2018.
More disruptive tentative interventions could consist of the implementation of more horizontal
governance logics which allow modifications of the rules at a federal level or to transform the
rules that regulate the monitoring. These interventions, however, should be carefully co-
designed together with those who participate in the day-to-day of these collectives. Our 
approach states that the development of decentralised tools which support commons 
governance should be undertaken as a gradual process to construct situated technology, 
with an awareness of the cultural context and aiming to incorporate particular social 
practices into the design of these decentralised tools. 
This basic example of a DAO illustrates, on the one hand, the relationship with Ostrom’s 
principles: monitoring mechanisms, local collective choice arrangements, graduated 
sanctions and clear boundaries. These principles are sustained by the aforementioned 
affordances of blockchain for commons governance. For example, tokenisation with regards 
to providing permission as to who has the ability to participate in the choices locally and at a 
federal level and how, as well as the certification of the level of commitment to the commons;
monitoring of the expenditures and reimbursements through the transparency provided by 
the blockchain; self-enforcement, formalisation and automatisation of the communitarian 
rules in the form of smart contracts. Another, more general, example of this is the increment 
in the degree of decentralisation of power over the platform because of the inherent 
decentralised properties of the technology itself. In this way, this could result in a partial shift 
of power over the platform from the Foundation towards the different nodes formed by the 
participants. Furthermore, as discussed, the fact that such rules are encoded in the form of 
configurations of smart contracts could facilitate the extension of practices and the 
development of new nodes; or even the deployment of alternative networks capable of 
operating as the former network, and reusing and adapting the encoded rules of the 
community while still using the shared infrastructure. Overall, further research of the role of 
decentralised technologies in commons governance offers, in this respect, a promising field 
of experimentation and exploration of the potential scalability of cooperative dynamics.
Discussion and Concluding Remarks
In this article I provided an overview and discussed an example of the affordances of 
blockchain technologies for commons governance. Concretely, I described such 
potentialities drawing on the example of a DAO to automatise some of the collaborative 
processes surrounding the compensation system of a community network: Guifi.net. 
Throughout this example, I aimed to illustrate, in more detail, the affordances of blockchain 
for commons governance which I presented during the symposium. The aim of this example 
is to illustrate how blockchain may facilitate the extension and scaling up of the cooperation 
practices of commons governance. Further explorations, more closely related to the 
architecture field, could explore the discussed affordances for commons governance with 
discrete design approaches that provide participatory frameworks for collective production.
[34] In this respect, decentralised technologies offer opportunities of exploration to tackle 
challenges such as those identified by Sánchez[35] to define ways to allocate ownership, 
authorship and distribution of value without falling into extractivist practices.
A better understanding of the capabilities of blockchain technologies for commons 
governance will require, however, further empirical research. Examples of research 
questions which need to be addressed are those with regards to the boundaries of the 
discussed affordances. For example, with regards to tokenisation and formalisation of rules: 
which aspects should remain in/off the blockchain, or furthermore completely in/out of code?
Overall, CBPP communities provide radically differing values and practices when compared 
with those in markets. In this respect, the study of the potentialities and limitations of 
blockchain technologies in the context of the governance of CBPP communities offers an 
inspiring opportunity to take further steps on a research journey that has only just begun.
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